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The other day I was told by a scientist of an
experiment in Professor Spemann's laboratory in
Freiburg: Biologists removed from the pre-
embryo of a lizard those cells which were ordained
to be the lizard's tail. They grafted the stolen
lizard cells onto the pre-embryo of a frog, grafting
them on at a point where the frog's nose was
destined to emerge. After the requisite period of
time passed, the tadpole and then frog appeared.
What do you suppose the frog had where its nose
belonged? A lizard's-
-nose!
The privilege against self-incrimination has, I
sometimes suspect, the awe-inspiring quality of
those life cells. To a person observing its operation
from distant space, the conclusion would be in-
escapable that the privilege contains a conscious-
ness of the whole organism of a legal proceeding,
and, while retaining some of its own unique charac-
teristics, miraculously transmogrifies, adapts,
assimilates to supply the organism what it needs.
One does not condemn the lizard's tail cells for
producing a nose on the frog's face any more than
one blames a blind man for reading with his hands.
One should not blame the privilege against self-
incrimination for demonstrating its infuriating
capacity to frustrate an otherwise untrammeled
inquisitor by supplying, in its own way, the
absent decencies.
However, things are not this simple.
The privilege is not always ideally suited to
supply what the organism needs (the frog would
have fared better with a frog's nose). And the
privilege sometimes supplies more than the or-
ganism needs. Like the mysterious life cells-which
sometimes lose their sense of purpose and run
riot, perhaps accounting for the disease called
cancer-the mysterious privilege against self-in-
crimination, unguided by any clear purpose,
sometimes runs riot.
["The" Privilege Is Many Things]
All of this being the case, an assignment to
discuss the privilege is a difficult one. There is, of
course, no "the" privilege. The privilege is many
things in as many settings. The privilege is a
prerogative of a defendant not to take the stand
in his own prosecution; it is also an option of a
witness not to disclose self-incriminating knowl-
edge in a criminal case, and in a civil case, and
before a grand jury and legislative committee and
administrative tribunal. It may also be a privilege
to suppress substances removed from the body or
admissions made in prior judicial proceedings or
to the police. It is sometimes held to apply be-
yond incrimination under domestic law to in-
crimination under foreign law (but not to disgrace
or to embarrassment of one's friends). It is applied
to excuse nondisclosure of political and religious
crimes; and it is applied to excuse nondisclosure of
common-law crimes of violence. Beatniks, bums
and ex-convicts are allowed to claim the privilege;
so are persons whose habits of nonconformity are
less obnoxious.
"-The" privilege is lurking in all of these settings,
and more. I have not time to treat all of the
problems which come to mind. I have selected
only two to discuss in any detail today. The first
is [A] the role of the privilege as a constitutional
doctrine. My thought in this regard is to asgess
the strength and nature of the strait jacket in
which we find ourselves. The second is [B] the
policy of the privilege. I will probe its purpose,
which, like the purpose embedded in a life cell,




[A.] THE PRIVILEGE AS A CONSTITUTIONAL
DOCTRNTE
The federal Constitution and the constitutions
of all but two states1 include language relating
specifically to self-incrimination. The language of
the 5th Amendment, known to you all, is "No
person.., shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself ..... This language
appears verbatim in 16 state constitutions.
2 It
appears with immaterial substitutions of syn-
onymous words in 14 more state constitutions.3
Different language coming to the same thing,
but more clearly applying only to an accused in
his own prosecution, exists in the constitutions of
11 other states.4 That language, with insignificant
variations, is, "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence
against himself."
Accounted for therefore are 41. To the "left"
of those 41 states are Iowa, which has no express
provision but reads the privilege into its due
process clause,' and New Jersey, which stubbornly
insists that the privilege there is solely a creature
of statute.' To the "right" are seven states with
provisions not too different from the Massachusetts
language, "No subject shall... be Compelled to
accuse, or furnish evidence against himself."
7
Iowa and New Jersey. See text at notes 5 and 6.
2 Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida,
Hawaii, Idaho, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New
York, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, West
Virginia, Wisconsin. Also, Canal Zone and Puerto Rico.
Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oregon, South
Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wyoming.
4 Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky,
Maine, Mississippi, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah.
5 See Amana Society v. Selzer, 94 N.W.2d 337, 339
(Iowa 1959).
6 See State v. White, 27 N.J. 158, 168-69, 142 A.2d
65, 70 (1958).
7 Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Oklahoma, Rhode Island. The Georgia
language-"No person shall be compelled to give
testimony tending in any manner to criminate himself"
-first appeared in the constitution of 1877. The Kansas
provision-"No person shall be a witness against
himself"-was in the original constitution adopted in
1859. The Lotisiana provision is the same as the federal
with this clause added: "...or in any proceeding that
may subject him to criminal prosecution ... ." This
broad form first appeared in the constitution of 1879.
The Massachusetts language appears in text above.
It antedated the federal constitutional provision by
nine years. The New Hampshire constitution, except
for a missing comma, has the Massachusetts provision.
It dates from 1784. Oklahoma's constitution, dating
from admission of the state to the Union in 1907, states
that "No person shall be compelled to give evidence
which will tend to incriminate him. ... " The Rhode
[Federal Promsion Originally Narrow]
There is little to explain what the drafters of
the federal Constitution meant by their words.
We have a few indicia, however.8 We have the
words themselves. And we have the scant legis-
lative history, the varying phraseologies used by
the many states, and the practice of official
questioning of suspects (not under oath) which
continued for decades after the federal and many
other constitutions were adopted. The prob-
abilities, in my opinion, substantially favor the
conclusion that the constitutional protection was
originally intended only to prevent return to the
hated practice of compelling a person, in a criminal
proceeding directed at him, to swear against
himself.9
This protection, until the end of the 19th
century, was not litigated partly for the reason
that for most of that time in most jurisdictions
criminal defendants were submerged in a large
class of persons disqualified as witnesses because
of interest. The question of the application of the
narrow constitutional clause never arose. The
broader protection-of witnesses, and in civil
cases-was given during the first years of this
nation solely on the basis of well-established
common law, without reference to constitutions.
For example, prior to 1868 the privilege had been
mentioned in only 15 reported federal cases,10 and
Island language is, "No man in a court of common law
shall be compelled to give evidence criminating him-
self." The word "criminating" was substituted for
"against" between October 9 and November 18, 1841,
during conventions preliminary to the adoption of the
state's first constitution in 1842.
8 For a discussion of these items of historical evidence,
see the authorities cited in note 20 infra.
9 See Silving, The Oath (pts. I & II), 68 YAT.E L. J.
1329, 1527 (1959), for an historical and analytical
treatment of the role of the oath-the "self-curse"-in
various legal systems including our own.
10 United States v. Saline Bank, 26 U. S. (1 Pet.)
100 (1828); United States v. Darnaud, 25 Fed. Cas.
754 (No. 14918) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1855); United States v.
Dickinson, 25 Fed. Cas. 850 (No. 14958) (C.C. Ohio
1840); Sanderson's Case, 21 Fed. Cas. 326 (No. 12297)
(C.C.D.C. 1829); Bank of the United States v. Wash-
ington, 2 Fed. Cas. 741 (No. 940) (C.C.D.C. 1828);
United States v. Craig, 25 Fed. Cas. 682 (No. 14883)
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1827); Devaughn's Case, 7 Fed. Cas.
560 (No. 3837) (C.C.D.C. 1824); United States v.
Liynn, 26 Fed. Cas. 1036 (No. 15649) (C.C.D.C. 1822);
United States v. Miller, 26 Fed. Cas. 1254 (No. 15772)
(C.C.D.C. 1821); United States v. Smith, 27 Fed. Cas.
1158 (No. 16332) (C.C.Conn. 1809); Ex parte Lindo,
15 Fed. Cas. 556 (No. 8364) (C.C.D.C. 1807); United
States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 38 (No. 14692e) (C.C. Va.
1807); United States v. Moses, 27 Fed. Cas. 5 (No.
15824) (C.C.D.C. 1804); Neale v. Coningham, 17 Fed.
1960]
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in none of those cases was the Constitution re-
ferred to, although in one of the cases a number of
authorities, including an English statute, were
cited by counsel for the witness." State consti-
tutional provisions were invoked by counsel in
several state cases during the early and middle
19th century. However, an Arkansas case in 1853
was the first to assert that the constitutional
privilege extended beyond the accused to a witness
in a criminal case,'
2 and an Indiana case in 1860
was the first to declare that the constitutional
privilege applied in a civil case.'
3
[From Counselman to Aridstein to Quinn]
In the federal sphere, it was not until after
Congress tampered with the privilege and the
resulting immunity statute was put to the test in
1892 that it had to be decided whether the privilege
as applied to a witness in a criminal proceeding
was assured by the Constitution or merely by the
common law. The Supreme Court in Couzselrnan
v. Hitchcock held that the privilege of a witness
before a grand jury was constitutionally guaran-
teed and was therefore beyond the power of the
legislature to alter.14 On the facts, this holding
was an easy exegesis because the testimony sought
might have exposed Counselman to prosecution
for the very crimes being investigated by that
grand jury-perhaps to an indictment by that
grand jury. The dictum was broad, however. It
was that "[tihe object [of the constitutional pro-
vision] was to insure that a person should not be
compelled, when acting as a witness in any in-
vestigation, to give testimony which might tend
to show that he himself had committed a crime."
15
Counselman was cited three decades later by the
Cas. 1266 (No. 10067) (C.C.D.C. 1802) (dissent);
United States v. Gooseley, 25 Fed. Cas. 1363 (No.
15230) (C.C. Va. 1790?).
"United States v. Miller, 26 Fed. Cas. 1254 (No.
15772) (C.C.D.C. 1821). Curiously, the federal con-
stitutional privilege was applied by a state court, in
Higdon v. Heard, 14 Ga. 255 (1853), to a civil party
against whom equitable discovery was sought. At that
time there was no constitutional privilege in Georgia,
and the court held that the common law privilege was
inapplicable because of a Georgia statute requiring
that discovery relating to gaming be made. The court
said that the effect of the federal constitutional privilege
was not to privilege disclosure in the state civil pro-
ceeding but rather was to prevent the use in a subse-
quent prosecution of the self-incriminating disclosures
compelled.
"State v. Quarles, 13 Ark. 307 (1853).
1v Wilkins v. Malone, 14 Ind. 153 (1860).
14 142 U. S. 547 (1892).
15 Id. at 563.
Court in McCarthy v. Arndstein to support the
further holding that the privilege as applied in
civil judicial proceedings was also constitutionally
guaranteed."6 And after another generation of
three decades, the Court in 1955, consistent with
its expanding philosophy of the privilege if not
with the federal constitutional language (nor
arguably, with what was the common law), sur-
prised no one when in Quinn v. United States and
Einspak v. United States it held that a witness
before a legislative committee could find sanctuary
in the third clause of the 5th Amendment.'
7
Thus the constitutional privilege by the cases
mentioned has been extended to all official inter-
rogations except perhaps those by the police.'
8
And by Hofman v. United States, as will be indi-
cated later, 9 it has been extended to disclosures
the protection of which I am sure would have
shocked the early judges.
[A Strait Jacket, Retail]
The series of decisions by the Court illustrates,
I think, a statement attributed to Mr. Justice
16 266 U. S. 34, 40, 42 (1924). Mr. Justice Brandeis,
delivering the opinion of the Court, said, "The govern-
ment insists, broadly, that the constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination does not apply in any civil
proceeding. The contrary must be accepted as settled.
The privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the
nature of the proceeding in which the testimony is
sought or is to be used. It applies alike to civil and
criminal proceedings, wherever the answer might tend
to subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it.
The privilege protects a mere witness as fully as it does
one who is also a party defendant. It protects, likewise,
the owner of goods which may be forfeited in a penal
proceeding. See Counselman v. Hitchcock ....
[Arndstein, a bankrupt being examined as to his assets
pursuant to statute] may, like any other witness, assert
the constitutional privilege; because the present statute
fails to afford complete immunity from prosecution."
17 Emspak v. United States, 349 U.. S. 190 (1955);
Quinn v. United States, 349 U. S. 155 (1955). Constru-
ing the more inclusive state constitutional language
mentioned earlier at note 7, both Massachusetts and
New Hampshire late in the 19th century had held that
the privilege applied in behalf of witnesses before legis-
lative committees. Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172, 9 Am.
Rep. 22 (1871); State v. Nowell, 58 N. H. 314 (1878).
The Wisconsin court, in In re Falvey, 7 Wis. 630 (1858),
had avoided such a holding, pointing out that his-
torically there was no privilege applicable before
parliamentary inquiries and that the statute authorizing
the inquiry granted immunity from subsequent use of
the facts disclosed in any event. See CUSoNG, ELE-
MENTS OF THE LAW AND PRAcTrCE OF LEGISLATIVE
AsSEMimLES iN =rE UNITED STATES 397 (2d ed. 1863).
Cushing held that there was no privilege in parliamen-
tary inquiries, but that disclosures could not be used as
evidence in criminal prosecutions.
"9 See text at note 56.
19 See text at note 58.
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Frankfurter. In response to a student's question
whether courts make law, the then Professor
Frankfurter is reported to have said, "Legislatures
make law wholesale. Courts make law retail." In
this series of cases, the Court "retailed" Congress
out of the "wholesale" business.
The constitutional strait jacket is on.
Indeed, although there are a few areas in which
a few tucks could be taken-for example, a re-
definition of "incrimination" to include disgrace,
personal harm, foreign risks and the like; or a
holding that the plea of privilege itself "tends to
incriminate"; or inclusion of the taking of body
fluids-it is difficult to see how the next generation
can continue the pace and deliver anything sig-
nificant say in 1984, a year already marked for
reasons not unrelated to our discussions in this
Northwestern University Law School centennial
celebration.
With the decisions of the last 70 years in mind,
I cannot and do not take the position that the
privilege against self-incrimination, as we now
know it, is not a constitutional doctrine. It certainly
is. Nor do I suggest that the law on the complex
subject should be controlled by a literal reading of
15 words penned five generations ago. It certainly
should not. My point, rather, is one which I am
by no means the first to make.20 It is quite simply
that, except for the narrow proscription of com-
pulsory sworn testimony from an accused in a
criminal proceeding directed at him, the privilege
has become a constitutional doctrine only piece by
piece and relatively recently. And in the process,
the constitutional privilege has incorporated and
exceeded the common law privilege against self-
incrimination.
[Three Conclusions]
Now, three conclusions follow:
-- [I] One is that any statements in judicial
opinions which justify recognition of the privilege
on the ground that the Founding Fathers might
otherwise be shocked at the treatment being
" See, e.g., MAYERS, SHALL WE Amraz =a Farvn
AmzNDmENT 183-227 (1959); Corwin, The Supreme
Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause,
29 MzcH. L. Rnv. 191, 191-96 (1930); Pittman, The
Fifth Amendment: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 42
A.B.A.J. 509 (1956).
For contrary views on the scope of the original
constitutional doctrine, see Franklin, The Encydopediste
Origin and Meaning of the Fifth Amendment, 15 LAW.
GUmD REv. 41 (1955); Note, Applicability of Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination to Legislative Investigations,
49 CoLum. L. REv. 87, 90-94 (1949).
accorded their great Charter are nonsense. Not
one in a hundred modem privilege cases falls
within their 5th Amendment intentions.
-[2] The second conclusion is that the fact that
the privilege is now a constitutional doctrine does
not really put us in an escape-proof strait jacket.
While the principle is now largely off limits to
legislatures (the only bodies equipped to deal with
the problem in a comprehensive way), it is obvi-
ously not beyond change. In this year 101 of
Darwin's "Origin of Species," we must recognize
that the privilege, perhaps by a series of what
judge Frank called "creative misunderstandings,"
has evolved and continues to evolve apace.21 The
pace is set by the Supreme Court of the United
States, and the state supreme courts, like metal
shavings in a magnetic field, fall into pattern.
-[3] The third conclusion is that the privilege,
receiving as it does no guidance from the con-
stitutional language, must receive guidance from
some underlying policy or policies-from some
2n "The critics of the Supreme Court, however, in
their over-emphasis on the history of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege, overlook the fact that a noble privilege
often transcends its origins, that creative misunder-
standings account for some of our most cherished
values and institutions; such a misunderstanding may
be the mother of invention." Frank, J., dissenting in
United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581 (2d
Cir. 1956), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957). The social value
of such "misunderstandings" is emphasized by Holmes:
"If truth were not often suggested by error, if old
implements could not be adjusted to new uses, human
progress would be slow." HoTA s, TaE CoutoN LAw
37 (1881).
Dealing with an analogous point, Mr. justice Frank-
furter had the following to say, "Law is a social organ-
ism, and evolution operates in the sociological domain
no less than in the biological. The vitality and therefore
validity of law is not arrested by the circumstances of
its origin. What Magna Carta has become is very
different indeed from the immediate objects of the
barons at Runnymede. The fact that scholarship has
shown that historical assumptions regarding the pro-
cedure for punishment of contempt of court were
ill-founded, hardly wipes out a century and a half of the
legislative and judicial history of federal law based on
such assumptions." Green v. United States, 356 U. S.
165, 189 (1958) (concurring opinion). And Mr. justice
Brennan, speaking of the development of the federal
rule excluding unconstitutionally obtained evidence,
recognized the role which may be played by judicial
mistake: "[T]he Court in Boyd v. United States, [116
U. S. 616 (1886),] and in subsequent cases has com-
mented upon the intimate relationship between the
privilege against unlawful searches and seizures and
that against self-incrimination. This has been said
[by Wigmore] to be erroneous history; if it was, it was
even less than a harmless error; it was part of the process
through which the Fourth Amendment, by means of the
exclusionary rule, has become more than a dead letter
in the federal courts." Abel v. United States, 362 U.S.
217, 255 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
1960]
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deeply felt sentiments worthy of constitutional
recognition. -n
So to the second part of my paper:
[B.] THE POLICY OF THE PRIVILEGE
There is no agreement as to the policy of the
privilege against self-incrimination. Indeed, al-
most as many purposes have been suggested as
there are exceptions to the hearsay rule, or as
there are uses for a screw driver. Compare the
screw driver. The screw driver at our house is
used to pry tops off cans, to gouge holes in wood,
to dig pits for tulip bulbs, to score lines and oc-
casionally even wrong-end-to to drive tacks. Once,
after hearing strange noises, I searched the house
for a prowler who was not there, clutching a screw
driver in my fist. But those things are not what a
screw driver isfor. Better suited for those purposes
are the lid-flipper, chisel, trowel, pencil, hammer
and knife respectively. A screw driver was created
and survives as a tool because it is the thing best
suited to drive screws.
Now consider the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. Here are the dozen policies which have
been advanced as its justification2-
2 On the point of guidance (or lack of it) given the
courts by the policies of the privilege against self-
incrimination, Professor Kalven had this to say: "[Tihe
law and the lawyers despite endless litigation over the
privilege have never made up their minds just what it
is supposed to do or just whom it is intended to pro-
tect .... [Slince the privilege is enshrined in the Bill of
Rights, has a long history, and has complex potenti-
alities, it cannot quite so readily be assumed that
attempts to use it today against a new problem are
obviously beyond its traditions or legitimate potenti-
alities." Kalven, Invoking the Fifth Amendment: Some
Legal and Impractical Considerations, 9 BULL. ATOM.
SCIENTISTS 181, 182-83 (1953).
2 The following books, reports, opinions and articles
are presented alphabetically by author. Each deals
favorably or unfavorably with one or more of the
policies stated in my list in the text. As the reasons for
the privilege are presented in the text below, the
appended footnotes indicate the authors to whose
writing I suggest you go for useful comment on the
point.
American Bar Association Committee on Improve-
ments in the Law of Evidence, Report, 63 REPORTS ov
THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 570, 591 (1938).
ALl MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rules 201(1), 203,
comment on 201(1) (1942).
BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (1827),
7 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 446-47, 449,
451-52, 454-55, 466 (Bowring ed. 1843).
Boudin, The Constitutional Privilege in Operation,
12 LAW. GUILD REV. 128, 149 (1952).
Cardozo, J., in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325-26 (1937).
CHAFEE, THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 186-90 (1956).
Clapp, Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 10
RUTGERS L. REV. 541, 542-50 (1956).
[Three Makeweights]
[1] One: It protects the innocent defendant
from convicting himself by a bad performance
on the witness stand.2 4
Field, J., in Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66
(1893).
Fisher, The Fifth Amendment and Forced Confessions,
71 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 945 (1954).
Fortas, The Fifth Amendment: Nemo Tenetur Prodere
Seipsumn, 25 CLEv. B.A.J. 91, 98-99 (1954).
Frank, J., dissenting in United States v. Grunewald,
233 F.2d 556, 580-82, 587-91 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd, 353
U.S. 391 (1957).
GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 7-9, 61,
75 (1955).
Kalven, Invoking the Fifth Amendment: Some Legal
and Impractical Considerations, 9 BULL. ATOM. ScIEN-
TISTS 181, 182-83 (1953).
Livingston, Introductory Report to the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1 WORKS OF EDWARD LIVINGSTON ON CRIMI-
NAL JURISPRUDENCE 332, 355-56 (1873).
MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 12-14 (1959).
Martin, J., in Aiuppa v. United States, 201 F.2d 287,
300 (6th Cir. 1952).
MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFT AMENDMENT
229-31 (1959).
McCORMICK, EVIDENCE 156, 253, 255-56 (1954);
Law and the Future: Evidence, 51 Nw. U. L. REV. 218,
221-22 (1956).
McKenna, J., dissenting in Wilson v. United States,
221 U.S. 361, 393 (1911).
Meltzer, Required Records, the McCarran Act, and
the Privilege Against Self-incrimination, 18 U. CHI. L.
REv. 687, 689-99, 701 (1951).
Moreland, Historical Background and Implications of
the Privilege Against Sdf-Incrimination, 44 KY L.J. 267,
274-76 (1956).
NEW JERSEY COMMITTEE ON THE REVISION OF TIHE
LAW OF EVIDENCE, REPORT TO THE SUPREME COURT
58 (1955).
NEW YORK CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMIT-
TEE, 9 PROBLEMS RELATING TO JUDIcIAL ADMINISTRA-
TION AND ORGANIZATION 920, 922-24, 926, 928-30
(1938).
Pound, Legal Interrogation of Persons Accused or
Suspected of Crime, 24 J. CRim. L. & C. 1014, 1015,
1017 (1934).
Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of
the Privilege Against Self-Incriminalion in America, 21
VA. L. REv. 763, 783 (1935).
Ratner, Consequences of Exercising the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 24 U. Cm. L. REv. 472,
484, 487-89 (1957).
STEPHEN, I A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 342-43, 441-42, 535, 543-44, 565-66 (1883)
(views first expounded in 1 JURIDICAL SOCIETY'S
PAPERS 456, 470 et. seq. (1857)).
TRAIN, COURTS, CRIMINALS, AND THE CAMORRA 19
(1912).
Warren, C. J., in Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S.
155, 161-62, 164 (1955).
Weinstein, The Law.s Attempt to Obtain Useful Tes-
timony, 13 3. OF SOCIAL IssUEs 6, 9 (1957).
8 WIGUORE, EVIDENCE §2251 (3d ed. 1940).
WISCONSIN COMMITTEE ON TRIAL PROCEDURE,
REPORT TO AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CRIMINAL LAW
AND CRIMINOLOGY (WISCONSIN BRANCH) (1910).




[2] Two: It avoids burdening the courts
with false testimony.
2 5
[3] Three: It encourages third-party wit-
nesses to appear and testify by removing the
fear that they might be compelled to incrimi-
nate themselves.
26
These first three reasons may have something
to them. The screw driver handle after all does
drive tacks. But are they not obvious make-
weights?2
25 Discussed in Frank and Meltzer.
21 Discussed in Chafee, Maguire, Meltzer, Ratner
and Wigmore.
27 [1] The nervous-innocent-person argument can
have application only to criminal defendants; the
privilege does not protect civil parties and third-party
witnesses, nervous or otherwise, from being called to
the witness stand. There is of course always a chance
that an innocent criminal defendant, by his poor wit-
ness-stand performance, will convict himself. To take
the stand with such a possibility, however slight, in
mind must be a frightening experience. But does the
risk of a miscarriage of justice for this reason exceed
the risk of a miscarriage of justice because of the infer-
ence which will surely be drawn from the defendant's
failure to testify? Probably not. Strangely enough, then,
the privilege in the mass of cases of frightened innocent
defendants (if it influences them at all) probably has a
net tendency to seduce them into convicting, not
saving, themselves by their silence.
[2] The privilege does not at a bargain price give
the tribunal significant protection against false testiniony.
Consider first [a] where the privilege is waived: There
are practical considerations, including the inference
usually drawn from the claim of privilege, which often
press reluctant defendants to testify and reluctant
witnesses to answer incriminating questions. The
testimony given in these instances may or may not be
perjured. It is not more likely to be truthful because
of the existence of the waived privilege. Then consider
[b] where the privilege is claimed: There certainly are
situations where, but for the privilege, the tribunal
would be given perjured testimony. But there are
also situations where, but for the privilege, the tribunal
would be given truthful testimony. The question here
is, Does the privilege, in the instances where it is
claimed, on balance leave the trier of fact in a better
or worse position for purposes of finding truth? This
question was faced and decided, rightly in m? opinion,
when the disqualification of interested persons as
witnesses was abolished. Evidence may be biased or
even perjured. But it should not be excluded on this
ground, especially not at the option of the interested
witness. From the point of view of truth-finding, it is
better to hear a witness, cross-examine him, and give
his testimony whatever weight it appears to deserve.
To the extent that the avoidance-of-perjury argument
is aimed not at improving the quality of information
available to the court, but rather at avoiding the in-
humanity of putting the witness in the position where
he is for practical purposes forced to lie, to commit a
serious crime against God, the point is covered ex-
plicitly in Reason 11.
[3] The argument that the privilege encourages
testimony of course has no application to the criminal
defendant, who must appear in court anyway and
[The "Futility" Argument]
[4] Four: The privilege is a recognition of
the practical limits of governmental power;
truthful self-incriminating answers cannot be
compelled, so why try.25
This argument may deserve more attention than
I give it in this paper. But I am unwilling to
accept the idea that the limits of the principle of
compulsory testimony shall be set without regard
for the legitimacy of the witness' refusal to disclose
Furthermore, I do not agree that this futility
argument applies to enough witnesses in enough
situations to account for anything approaching
the present privilege against self-incrimination:
Is it clear that most witnesses in most situations
would elect to remain silent or to perjure them-
selves in order to avoid making self-incriminating
disclosures? Nor am I persuaded by the collateral
point that because many people would provide
perjurious answers it is intolerably unfair to insist
upon disclosure from the honest witness. And,
finally, what problems of Game Theory, of Brink-
manship, do we invite if we admit to witnesses at
large that the limits of compulsory disclosure are
at the point where they no longer succumb to the
threat of punishment?
I like to think-though I may be wrong-that
the latent merits in this Reason 4 may be found
not in the fact of contumacy but rather in the
justifications for it. The justifications, if any,
appear elsewhere in the list of reasons.
[Appeals to Prejudice and Reverence]
[5] Five: The privilege prevents procedures
of the kind used by the infamous courts of
whd, if he testifies, waives his privilege. The argument
has little or no application to parties in civil litigation,
whose presence and testimony for practical purposes
are compelled by tactical considerations. Those who
advance this argument do so only with respect to
third-party witnesses. And, as to them, there is not
much reason to think that a potential witness, with
a choice whether or not to appear at the inquiry, would
be influenced to do so by the existence of the privilege.
It is no pleasure to have to claim the privilege-to
run the risk of'having it denied and to bear the con-
sequences of the inferences drawn from the claim if it is
allowed. Indeed, if, as this argument implies, the
value of the privilege is to be measured in terms of
total information gotten from third-party witnesses,
the rivilege probably produces for the court a net
loss. This is so because a person without a choice
whether to appear-one who cannot a oid appearing-
may be excused by the privilege from giving informa-
tion which otherwise might be extracted.
28 Suggested in Meltzer.
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Star Chamber, High Commission and In-
quisition.
29
[6] Six: It is justified by history, whose
tests it has stood; the tradition which it has
created is a satisfactory one.
30
These last two statements are platitudes. They
are not reasons at all-at least not in the sense
that they provide us with a rationale useful in
deciding future difficult cases. 3'
[Off-Point Arguments]
[7] Seven: The privilege preserves respect
for the legal process by avoiding situations
which are likely to degenerate into undigni-
fied, uncivilized and regrettable scenes.2
[8] Eight: It spurs the prosecutor to do a
complete and competent independent investi-
gation.n
Reasons seven and eight are merely statements,
21 Discussed in Bentham, McCormick and Warren.
o Discussed in Bentham, Griswold, Maguire, Mc-
Kenna and Warren.
3' [51 The naked association of compulsory self-
incrimination with the unpopular Star Chamber pro-
duces no valid conclusion. Not everything about the
Court of the Star Chamber or the other inquisitional
courts was bad (they were, for example, quite efficient!).
The requirement of self-incrimination, if it is bad, is
bad for reasons not stated in this argument. To the
extent that the argument is elliptical-intending to
assert that there should be interrogation only after
formal presentment, or that interrogations should be
humane, or that proceedings which further "bad"
law are bad-the argument is more specifically made
elsewhere.
[6] The argument that the privilege is good because
it is supported by history and by the constitutions must
be treated with deference. The statement is true. And
if the question is whether the privilege should be
abolished in its entirety, it properly puts the burden
of proof on the inconoclast. But the argument, without
particulars, is not meaningful when the question is
how to construe the privilege in particular cases. It is,
as I said in the text, a platitude which, in judicial
opinions, is an acceptable substitute for reasons. True,
with expert opinion on the policy of the privilege in
such discord, it is unlikely that the majority of an
appellate court could agree on a statement of meaning-
ful reasons; and, more important, it is likely that the
bar and public to which the judicial opinion is ad-
dressed will accept the reference to history with much
less criticism than they would any set of particular
reasons the court could devise. Nevertheless, palatable
as it may be, Reason No. 6 is no more than an appeal
to reverence just as, in Reason No. 5, reference to the
Star Chamber is an appeal to prejudice. The real
reasons must be found elsewhere.
2 Discussed in Clapp, Frank, Maguire, Meltzer,
N.Y. Committee and Stephen.
11 Discussed in Chafee, Clapp, Maguire, Meltzer,
N.J. and N.Y. Committees, Stephen and Wigmore.
in less satisfactory terms, of more basic rationales
to be mentioned at the end of the list.
In my opinion, the policies central to the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination can be identified
by discussing only the four reasons yet to come.
I offer for your consideration my analysis of those
reasons, an analysis in which I still have some
confidence despite the wounds it suffered from the
rapiers of my colleagues at the Harvard Law
School who were kind enough to read an early
draft of this paper.
31 [7] The privilege does contribute to respect for
the legal process. But respect is derivative. Any respect
engendered by the privilege is respect reflecting favor-
able opinion as to the values honored by the law in this
area of its fact-finding procedures. Those values, un-
stated in this argument, must be the reasons for the
privilege.
[8] The argument that the privilege is good because
it spurs the prosecutor to make an independent investi-
gation, it should be noted, has no significant application
to claims of privilege by parties or witnesses in civil
proceedings or by third-party witnesses in criminal
trials. Its reasoning is limited to claims by defendants
in criminal cases and by suspects in preliminary in-
quisitions. But more important: The argument, al-
though phrased in terms of what the privilege en-
courages, obviously intends to imply only that there is
something bad which the privilege deters. Assuming the
truth of the implied proposition that existence of the
privilege does cause additional independent investiga-
tion, can this additional investigation be the aim of the
privilege? It cannot be. The ultimate objective, other
things being equal, cannot be to require the prosecutor
to do his job in a hard rather than an easy way! On
the contrary, other things being equal, it is quite de-
sirable that the prosecutor and the police allocate their
limited resources so as to seek out the evidence most
easily obtainable and most indicative of truth.
What is the hidden meaning in the argument? [a]
Does it relate to efficiency? Is it that absent such an
independent investigation some cases will come out
wrong, presumably acquitting guilty defendants? No.
The privilege is not given to the accused in order to
guarantee that the state's case against him will be
better. [b] Does the hidden meaning of the argument
relate to conduct toward the accused? Yes, surely it
does. The proponents of the argument reason as follows:
[il Government should acquire evidence necessary for
prosecution of criminals; [ii] government should not
have the right to get evidence from the suspect; there-
fore, [iii] government should get evidence from "in-
dependent investigation." This conclusion, which as
indicated sprang fronz the principle that government
should not have the right to get evidence from the
suspect, is then advanced as a reason for the principle
that government should not have the right to get
evidence from the suspect! The reasoning is of course
circular.
The fundamental question remains: Why not have
the right to get the evidence from the suspect? Be-
cause it would upset the "fair" state-individual balance
or would lead to the successful prosecution of "bad
laws"? Because it is not humane or may lead to torture?
The true reasons are only negatively implied.
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[The 5th as a 1st Amendment Privilege]
[9] Nine: The privilege aids in the frustra-
tion of "bad laws" and "bad procedures,"
especially in the area of political and religious
belief.3L 5
This reason has appeal, especially now in what
most of us hope is the twilight of an era of ir-.
responsible legislative investigating committees
and especially when we recognize that the history
of the privilege dearly shows that it sprang from
attempts to frustrate valid (but bad) belief-control
laws.
The reason is difficult to handle.
On the one hand, it seems clear that the privilege
is useful to frustrate official inquiries which have
evil objectives only because it is useful sometimes
to frustrate official inquiries no matter what the
objectives. Does the law wish to tolerate a device
the purpose of which is to make law unenforceable?
Well, we know that the law does not exclude such
a possibility. That is one of the principal functions
of the jury, especially in criminal cases.36 But the
law would be foolish if it put the discretion to
frustrate, the safety valve, in the hands of the
person least likely to use it properly-the witness
35 See Boudin, Chafee, Frank, Kalven, Griswold,
Pittman and Stephen.
36 Professor Henry Hart was the author of the follow-
ing dictum: "It is important to proper administration
of the law that the public believe in the humanity and
justice of decisions. This value the law seeks to serve
partly through the institution' of the jury trial. The
Jury, representing 'the people,' is deliberately inserted
as a kind of cushion between the individual on the one
hand and the coercive power of the state on the other.
The jury, always in criminal cases, and within broad
limits in civil cases, is allowed to thwart the law's
commands-in effect to find the facts untruthfully-if
it is not satisfied with the justness of the commands
as applied to the case in hand." Hart and McNaughton,
Evidece and Inference in the Law, 87 DAEDALUs:
J. Am. AcAD. or ARTS & S. 40, 50 (1958).
The suggestion has been made that, historically,
the two devices of the jury and the privilege combined
to frustrate "bad law." "This privilege against self-
incrimination... was insisted upon as a defensive
weapon of society and society's patriots against laws
and proceedings that did not have the sanction of
public opinion. In all the cases that have made the
formative history of this privilege and have lent to it
its color, all that the accused asked for was a fair trial
before a fair and impartial jury of his peers, to whom
he should not be forced by the state or soverigla to
confess his guilt of the fact charged. Once before a
jury, the person accused needed not to concern him-
self with the inferences that the jury might draw from
his silence, as the jurors themselves were only too eager
to render verdicts of not guilty in the cases alluded
to." Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History
of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America,
21 VA. L. REv. 763, 783 (1935).
being compelled to disclose, the person whose
interest it is to thwart the proceeding no matter
how "good" its objective. There seems to be no
escape from the conclusion that one who employs
the privilege solely to frustrate a valid proceeding
is misusing the privilege, that he is in fact practic-
ing a form of civil disobedience.
On the other hand, civil disobedience is some-
times honorable. Consider the civil disobedience
of Jesus Christ, George Washington, Mahatma
Gandhi and Albert Bigelow, the Quaker who in
1958 attempted to sail his boat, the "Golden
Rule," into the Eniwetok testing grounds. (The
civil disobedience of Willard Uphaus, a person
well-known to this afternoon's other American
panelist, Attorney General Wyman, is now at-
tending the judgment of history.) Civil disobe-
dience frequently leads to improvements in the law.
Should persons who are less frank than say Gandhi
about their disruptive objectives-perhaps be-
cause to them martyrdom offers no irresistible
appeal-be condemned out-of-hand for achieving
their ends by misusing the privilege against self-
incrimination?
Things being as they are in some grand jury
and legislative committee inquiries, I am satisfied
that this Reason No. 9 cannot be dismissed.
Adequate 1st Amendment protections are absent:
There is no solid tradition of official self-restraint
in the "anti-belief" area and no established
privilege not to disclose matters related closely to
religious, political and moral belief and activities.n
7 Such a "1st Amendment privilege" may just now
be in its infancy. See Barenblatt v. United States,
360 U.S. 109 (1959) (5 to 4 decision), for a discussion
of Wa'tkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957),
Sweezy V. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957), and
other cases in point. In Barenblatt v. United States,
the petitioner, a teacher, refused to answer questions
asked by a subcommittee of the Un-American Activities
Committee. The questions related to his present and
past membership in the Communist Party, his past
membership in certain organizations, and whether he
knew a certain person "as a member of the Communist
Party." The opinion at page 126 recognized a qualified
privilege: "Undeniably, the First Amendment in
some circumstances protects an individual from being
compelled to disclose his associational relationships.
However, the protections of the First Amendment,
unlike a proper claim of the privilege against self-
incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, do not
afford a witness the right to resist inquiry in all circum-
stances. Where First Amendment rights are asserted
to bar governmental interrogation resolution of the
issue always involves a balancing by the courts of the
competing private and public interests at stake in the
particular circumstances shown." Later, at page 134,
the opinion concluded that "the balance between the
individual and the governmental interests here at
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I am reluctant therefore to condemn the "misuse"
of the device which has always been particularly
effective to frustrate "belief probes" and which is
often the only device available to do the job. I am
reluctant even though the device is much too
blunt and thus is available to frustrate proper as
well as improper proceedings, proper as well as
improper questions.
It should be acknowledged, however, that the
"lst Amendment" reason for the 5th Amendment
privilege is by definition limited to free-speech,
-religion and -assembly situations. It has no appli-
cation in normal day-to-day criminal investigation
and prosecution. None. If the judges would only
recognize this one truth and treat the "1st Amend-
ment" 5th Amendment cases separately, at least
half of the confusion and nine-tenths of the
emotion enmeshing the privilege against self-
incrimination would be dissipated.
(Ask yourselves: How many civil libertarians in
this audience would be concerned-really con-
cerned-with the 5th Amendment privilege if
there were an adequate Ist Amendment privilege?
And how many criminal lawyers here represented
are delighted to have the 1st Amendment-5th
Amendment confusion continue so your clients can
undeservedly reap its harvest?)
stake must be struck in favor of the latter, and that
therefore the provisions of the First Amendment have
not been offended." See also Uphaus v. Wyman, 360
U.S. 72 (1959) (5 to 4 decision), involving the refusal
on 1st Amendment grounds to produce records before
the state attorney general, who was authorized by joint
resolution of the legislature to conduct investigations.
The records allegedly showed the names of persons
who had attended a "World Fellowship" camp, a
camp at which a number of Communists spoke. Uphaus'
conviction for contempt was affirmed.
Compare Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516
(1960), in which a refusal to make disclosure was
upheld on 1st (via 14tl) Amendment grounds. Little
Rock and North Little Rock passed tax ordinances
requiring local organizations to disclose their members
and contributors. The custodians of the NAACP records
were convicted and fined for refusing to make the dis-
closures. The repressive effect of the ordinance upon
the NAACP and its members was uncontraverted.
The Supreme Court reversed the convictions, holding
that "the municipalities have failed to demonstrate a
controlling justification for the deterrence of free
association which compulsory disclosure of the mem-
bership lists would cause." Id. at 527. Compare also
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960), in which it
was held unconstitutional to punish a person for failure
to comply with an ordinance requiring handbills to bear
the names and addresses of the persons responsible for
them.
[Privilege to Commit Crime?]
The next reason for the privilege may be a
hybrid, sharing some attributes with Reason 9
just mentioned and some with Reason 12 yet to
come. Or it may be no reason at all. I tender it
gingerly and (at the present stage of my thought
on the subject) without approval. It is-
[10] Ten: The privilege, together with the
requirement of probable cause prior to prose-
cution, protects the individual from being
prosecuted for crimes of insufficient notoriety
or seriousness to be of real concern to society.
The concern here is mainly with the "fishing
expedition," with what Wigmore called the "un-
lawful process of poking about in the speculation
of finding something chargeable.
' 38
The pure "poking about" fishing expedition has
a peculiar odious characteristic: The fishing ex-
pedition, if allowed, could put all or any of us in
jaill
Each of us, after all, is a criminal more or less 9
But as to most of our crimes we are, practically
speaking, the indispensable threshold witnesses.
There is just no one who knows nearly as much
as we ourselves about where to go to find what
evidence of which crimes! It could go without
saying that the law does not intend that all of
these crimes be prosecuted. The existence of the
great majority of them is known only to their
38 8 WiG omO , EviDENcE §2250, at 284 (3d ed. 1940).
,9 H. L. Mencken pointed out that "society, in
order to protect the weak and botched against the bold
and original, has had to proclaim certain human acts,
under certain circumstances, as too dangerous to be
permitted, and hence as what we call criminal. Most of
us aspire to the majority of those acts in secret, and
some of us commit them surreptitiously, but the man
who performs them in such a manner that the fact
becomes notorious is a menace to the security of the
rest of us, and we go through the solemn hocus-pocus
of seizing him and trying him, and pump up indignation
over his rascality, and finally visit upon him the thing
called punishment." Mencken, A Menken Chrestoin-
athy, in VoicEs iN COURT 540 (Davenport ed. 1958).
And Professor Schwartz made the following obser-
vation: "The paradoxical fact is that arrest, conviction,
and punishment of every criminal would be a catas-
trophe. Hardly one of us would escape, for we have all
at one time or another committed acts that the law
regards as serious 6ffenses. Kinsey has tabulated our
extensive sexual misdeeds. The Bureau of Internal
Revenue is the great archive of our false swearing and
cheating. The highway death statistics inadquately
record our predilection for manslaughter. 100% law
enforcement would not leave enough people at large
to build and man the prisons in which the rest of us
would reside." Schwartz, On Current Proposals to
Legalize Wire Tapping, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 157 (1954).
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perpetrators and perhaps to persons in' pari
delicto or who for other understandable reasons
prefer that the misdeed be forgotten. A system of
criminal law enforcement which punished, or even
detected, all such crimes would be insufferable.
Similarly, it would be a frightening situation if the
system were constructed so that the prosecutor
had it within his power to select from all of the
crimes of all of us the ones to pursue. A license to
wiretap our brains could, as I indicated a moment
ago, put us all, or any chosen ones of us, in the
dock if not in a cell.
The place to nip this specter may be in the bud-
by depriving the state of authority to compel
self-incriminatory disclosures. The probable-cause
requirements, with the privilege tacitly built in,
prevent the fishing expedition in regular criminal
proceedings. Sometimes, however, in grand-jury,
legislative and administrative-agency inquiries,
where there is no probable-cause requirement,
there is only the privilege to perform this function.
Only two reasons remain. In them, I suggest,
must be found the essence of policy of the privilege
against self-incrimination applicable in the normal
day-to-day criminal investigation and prosecution.
[Avoidance of Inhumane Treatment]
[11] Eleven: The privilege prevents torture
and other inhumane treatment of a human
being.
An aspect of civilization is an aversion to the
knowing infliction of suffering-an aversion to
cruelty. Modem man insists that beef cattle be
killed in a humane way and he is revolted by the
method used on geese to produce pate defoie gras.
He no longer hangs his felons in public (if at all),
and he no longer takes the rod to his child.
What bearing does all this have on the privilege
against self-incrimination?
This: The law, it is said, will not authorize
compulsory disclosure if the situation falls within
a class in which inhumane force is likely to be
brought to bear to overcome the person's re-
luctance to disclose or where the private interests
affected are so great that it would be inhumane to
compel it.
[a] "Third degree" methods 0 employed by the
ancient continental inquisitional courts of course
fall within the proscribed kinds of force. And the
40 See A.L.I. Code, Bentham, Cardozo, Chafee,
Clapp, Griswold, Maguire, Mayers, McCormick,
Moreland, N.J. Committee, Pittman, Pound, Stephen
and Train.
torture occasionally employed by the antecedents
of our own criminal courts is unacceptable to us
today. It is said that a modem American court or
grand jury or investigating agency or legislative
committee or some new creation authorized fo
compel disclosures might, but for the privilege,
revert to such barbaric practices. This I simply do
not believe. I dismiss the argument.,
[b] Short of torture, what abuses of the witness
loom? There is browbeating or bullying.4 When a
legal right to an answer exists, one can expect the
presiding official to allow the questioner wide
latitude in his attempts to extract relevant in-
formation of any kind from a witness reluctant
for any reason. The latitude, at least in legislative-
committee and grand-jury investigations and in
hearings before magistrates, frequently includes
bullying and browbeating. This of course is quite
obnoxious to civilized sensitivities. Perhaps there
is something to the thought that when the state is
putting questions, the answers to which will dis-
close criminal activities by the witness, we are
very likely to find an especially high insistence
checked by an especially high reluctance and
consequently too frequent resort to verbal abuse
rather than to orderly contempt proceedings in an
attempt to break the stalemate. If so, the privilege
against self-incrimination has found a partial
justification.
[A Reluctant Witness' Trilemna]
[c] What about the feeling that it is inhumane
to force a witness to choose ainong the three horns
of the triceratops (harmful disclosure, contempt,
perjury)?42 The first thing to observe is that the
problem is not peculiar to the situation in which
self-incriminatory disclosure is demanded. In one
degree or another it is a problem inherent in the
principle of compulsory testimony. Witnesses
reluctant for whatever reason face thi§ trilemma.
[i] The distinguishing point where self-
incriminatory disclosures are demanded, according
to some people, seems to be that the trilemma may
be resolved in favor of disclosure! That is, that
the witness' "will" will have been broken. Or, put
another way, that the witness will have been
forced to do a "stultifying" thing.43
Is there an elusive something to this point?
41 See A.B.A. Committee, A.L.I. Code, Bentham,
Cardozo, Chafee, Clapp, Mayers, Meltzer, N.Y. Com-
mittee, Pound-and Stephen.
4 See Bentham, Frank, Martin and Meltzer.
43 Suggested by Fisher and Frank.
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The thought seems to be that, whereas a truly
voluntary confession of wrongdoing does the
confessor immense psychological good, its opposite
produces the opposite. The point, it seems to me
intuitively, has merit, if any, only when the
disclosure is [A] a confession, [B] made invol-
untarily, [C] of conduct reprehensible in the
witness' own mind, [D] by a witness whose ability
psychologically to rehabilitate himself-to "live
with" his having done the reprehensible thing-
will be impaired by adding to his commission of
the reprehensible act his admission that he com-
mitted it. Perhaps I should add, as another relevant
factor, the audience to which the'disclosure is
made: [E] The larger and the more comprehending
this audience is and the more important the
opinions of this audience are to the' witness, the
more "stultifying" the disclosure would seem to be.
The elusive something, then, that there may be
to this "self-stultification" point is in any event
very limited. At the very most it applies only to
unambiguous confessions of quite reprehensible
misdeeds-not to "clues" and the like, remotely
implying minor turpitude.
[ii] According to others, the point which dis-
tinguishes the compulsion of self-incriminatory
disclosures seems to be that the trilemma will
probably be resolved by the witness in favor of
perjury, and that this is an "intolerable invasion
of his 'personality'."4' The thought is that it is
inhumane to force a religious witness to violate his
sacred oath-to commit a crime against God. And
I suppose that a kindred argument could be pre-
sented that it is inhumane to force any witness,
religious or otherwise, to violate the "categorical
imperative"-to break faith with his rational
commitment to truth-telling as a necessary moral
principle.
Before I received the responses of my colleagues
to the early draft of this paper, I believed that this
inhumanity-of-coerced-perjury point was not too
important. I am still of that mind with respect to
the agnostic and atheistic witness. I underesti-
mated, however, the importance attributed by
many to the religious consideration. Perhaps my
reaction was the result of my own experiences
with witnesses in action. Perjury is commonplace.
44United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 591
(2d Cir. 1956)(Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd 353 U.S.
391 (1957). See Silving, supra note 9, at 1346, for a
report of the views to this effect of Franciscus Mem-
mius, expressed in 1698 as a result of an inquiry ordered
by Pope Innocent XII.
It is too commonplace to be thought of by the
average witness as a soul-destroying experience.
In any event, the religious argument could in
many circumstances be met in a manner more
sensible than a grant of privilege. It could be met
by eliminating the oath-a procedure followed, I
understand, quite commonly on the Continent.
[d] Last of the inhumanities the avoidance of
which is said to justify the privilege is that of
compelling a witness to commit the "unnatural
act" of inflicting injury on himself.45 True, Shake-
speare considered it important that the king be
forced to drink the very wine he had poisoned to
kill Hamlet, and Olsen and Johnson thought it
necessary to have the slain duck fall on the hunter's
head. The element of hoist-with-his-own-petard
incongruity, which in legitimate drama provides
poetic justice and in vaudeville creates humor, on
a witness stand undoubtedly produces an incre-
ment of cruelty. However, it is by no means clear
to me that that increment of cruelty, by itself,
comes to much. Nor is it clear to me that the
cruelty incident to compelling a witness to harm
himself outweighs the need for disclosure in
enough cases to justify unqualified privilege when-
ever self-incrimination is involved.
[Right to be Let Alone and to a Fair Fight]
[12] Twelve: The privilege contributes to-
ward a fair state-individual balance by re-
quiring the government to leave the individual
alone until good cause is shown for disturbing
him and by requiring the government in its
contest with the individual to shoulder the
entire load. 46
There is a strong policy in favor of government's
leaving people alone, and there is a complementary
strong policy which demands that any contest
between government and governed be a "fair"
one. It follows that the government should not
disturb the peace of an individual by way of
compulsory appearances and compulsory dis-
closures which may lead to his conviction unless
sufficient evidence exists to establish probable
cause. Obviously, if the individual's peace is to be
preserved, the government must obtain its prima
facie case from sources other than the individual.
According to Dean Wigmore, there was a moment
45 See Frank, Griswold, Meltzer, Stephen and Wein-
stein.




in the early 1600s when the privilege, in its pri-
mordial state, was assumed to go no further than
this; it was not doubted that a suspect could be
made to respond to questions once he was properly
accused; it was just that a person could not be
compelled to provide the first evidence against
himself.v
The principle was not long so limited, in any
event.
In the 1641 flood, which ostensibly was aimed
at the fishing expedition and which therefore swept
away the Courts of Star Chamber and High
Commission and of course the hated oath ex
officio, the ground was washed from under all
compulsory self-incrimination. 48 Since 1680 it has
been assumed that, even though probable cause
has been established (and the peace of the indi-
vidual may be disturbed to the extent that he i's
required to stand trial), nevertheless the govern-
ment cannot compel self-incriminatory disclosures.
That not only the oath ex officio but all au-
thority to compel self-incriminatory disclosures
was extinguished in the final decades of the 17th
century may be attributable to the revolution in
political thought which was occurring at the time.
The sovereign king was being supplanted by the
sovereign individual. This philosophy, dominant
now for three centuries, naturally nurtures the
concept that the individual may not be conscripted
to assist his adversary, the government, in doing
him in. It would not be a "fair fight."
49
(It might be worth saying in this connection
that the original privilege against self-incrimi-
nation probably was, in the time of the emanci-
pation of the individual from tyranny of kings,
"one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to
make himself civilized."' 0 This opinion was stated
4 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENcE §2250, at 293-96 (3d ed.
1940).
48 8 id. §2250, at 292-93.
49 Jeremy Bentham called this argument the "fox
hunter's reason." BENT TAm, RATIONALE of JUDICIAL
EVIDENCE (1827), 7 THE Wolls OF JEREMy BNmA"
454 (Bowring ed. 1843). That the feeling is part of
our culture is confirmed by the unwritten code which
governs every fight in the great American morality
plays, the TV westerns. Inroads on this sentiment
have slowly been made in litigation on the civil side.
Inroads are not yet perceptible on the criminal side.
60GRISWOLD, THE Frx AMENDMENT TODAY 7
(1955). The dean, in his speech delivered at this cen-
tennial celebration on May 13, 1960, confirmed, I think,
that he is a "Reason Niner" (for explanation, see my
text supra at and following note 35). It is out of respect
for the freedom-of-belief arguments he and others per-
suasively present that I urge the development of an
adequate 1st Amendment privilege-one which *ould
precipitate the mud out of the 51h Amendment water.
by Dean Erwin Griswold in a speech directed at
the excesses of (what I have called) "belief probes"
in the early- and mid-1950s. The language has
been quoted frequently by the courts. I remind
you, however, that times, problems and especially
the privilege against self-incrimination have
changed almost beyond recognition in the past
three centuries. Today our nation is one of expand-
ing, mixing and mobile populations, complex inter-
dependencies, shortening cultural roots and, inci-
dentally, a homicide rate 10 times that in England.
I suggest that, in this context, the privilege against
self-incrimination-at least in its modem shape,
doing much more than frustrating "belief probes"
-may be an expensive gesture indeed. It may in
most applications be an example of man's casuistic
insistence upon being civilized to a fault.)
Well, those are the dozen reasons given.
The reasons, obviously, are not mutually ex-
clusive; there is much overlapping. Furthermore,
the proponents and detractors of the dozen reasons
have not always put them just as I have, and have
frequently gone into much more detail in their
discussions, but I think that this list of 12 ex-
hausts the reasons for the privilege against self-
incrimination appearing in legal literature. Unless,
of course, we add two, with the significant numbers
0 and 13, which are, Number 0, that the privilege
has no justifying policy;"1 and, Number 13, that
much, much more testimony should be privileged
anyway, so we should accept the privilege against
self-incrimination, crude as it is, and be thankful
for small favors.
The former needs no explanation. The latter
needs a good deal of explanation because it is
possible that it is at this point where those for and
those against the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation really join issue.
[Reason Number 13?]
This much I*will say today about "Reason 13":
The present system of compulsory attendance and
However, since there is not yet such a 1st Amendment
privilege to which they can resort and since the privilege
against self-incrimination at its beginning, certainly
performed a Reason 9 function, my chances of persuad-
ing "Reason Nimers" to relinquish their grip on the
fringes of the 5th Amendment are probably about as
good as those of persuading Southerners to quit calling
themselves Democrats.
1 See TtAIN, CouRTs, C &Azws, AND TmE CAAmomA
19 (1912); WiscoNsm ComarrTEE oN TRIAL PRo-
cEDuR, R_ PoRT To AM ERIcA INsTITUTE or CRIMINAL
LAW AND CRInIIOLOGY (Wisconsin Branch) (1910);
AI MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, comment on rule
201(1) (1942).
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disclosure is unbearably inflexible. It is based on
the black-and-white idea that practically speaking
the only limit to testimonial compulsion is rele-
vancy, with little regard given by the law to the
inconvenience of attending and none to the risks
to reputation, fortune, friends and even life which
can be wrought by compelling a human being to
make a disclosure which might be of only the
slightest legitimate importance to the inquisitor.
A paper could be given on this point alone.52
5 Since the early days of Elizabeth I, when one ran
serious risk of a suit for maintenance if he testified in a
case, things have changed drastically but by almost
imperceptible degrees. Now one may be jailed or sued
for failure to attend or testify. The reasoning is that
"[ihe right to sue and defend in the courts is the al-
ternative of force. In an organized society it is the
right conservative of all other rights, and lies at the
foundation of orderly government." Chambers v.
Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907)
(Moody, J.). And "[tihe suppression of truth is a
grievous necessity at best... ; it can be justified at all
only when the opposed private interest is supreme ......
McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377, 378 (2d Cir. 1937)
(L. Hand, J.).
As a consequence there are very few rules which
permit nondisclosure on grounds that c6mpulsory
disclosure would invade an interest of the witness-that
is, on grounds that disclosure would cause undue harm
to the witness or to something or someone dear to him.
There seems to be a privilege not to disclose theological
opinions, and there may be a privilege not to disclose
trade secrets. The husband-wife incompetency, in
one of its formulations, is a privilege of one spouse not
to testify against the other. In many jurisdictions
there lingers a privilege not to submit to physical
examination. That, unless we admit the privilege
against self-incrimination to the category, is all. There
is no clear-cut privilege not to disclose political opinions
(see note 37 supra). Nor is there a privilege against
disclosing facts which tend to lead to self-degradation,
-assassination or -bankruptcy. There is no privilege
against doing in a mother, brother or child, or against
making disclosures which will lead to the felling of a
favorite tree or to the gassing of a beloved dog.
The law takes the position that the relationship
between the degree of materiality of the evidence and
the degree of anguish caused the witness by its dis-
closure is irrelevant. Even the catchall Rule 45 of the
Uniform Rules of Evidence ignores this consideration.
Disclosure must be made.
A useful purpose would be served by a thorough
analysis of the whole concept of compulsory testi-
mony. Among the questions to be asked are: (1) What
are the "hard-core" areas in which the need for infor-
mation or the harm to the witness is always so great
or so small as to require that disclosure be compelled
or privileged, as the case may be? (2) How should the
judge inform himself adequately to exercise discretion
intelligently-a significant problem where disclosure
even to the judge is resisted by the witness? (3) To
what extent would "judge-shopping" and loss of respect
for the courts result from discretion being exercised in
one way by one judge and in another way by another
judge? (4) What difficulties in planning a case would be
caused by the fact that parties cannot know in advance
whether the affected evidence will be admitted? (5)
It should be noted, however, that the injustice
caused by this inflexibility of the system is not, on
balance, alleviated by the privilege. The privilege
itself is inflexible; it is unqualified. Even when
limited to its proper uses, it is far too broad: In
order to insure that a great private interest is
protected when the public need for information is
small, it denies a great public need when the
private interest is small. Also, being limited to
self-incrimination, the privilege is too narrow to
alleviate the injustices of the inflexible system in
other areas where public need conflicts with
private interests. It is both too broad and too
narrow to have a positive net value.
It should be clear by now that the policy under-
pinning the privilege is anything but clear. The
most I can hope to have achieved is to have "left
the darkness entirely unobscured." That was the
remark reportedly made by Whitehead about an
exposition by Russell. Perhaps a little more than
that is possible. I can give you my own view, good
at least for the present moment, in capsule form.
[The "Real" Reasans]
It is my opinion that the privilege, like the
screw driver, is used for all sorts of reasons, most
of them having little or no relation to its purpose.
The significant purposes of the privilege remaining
In what respect are the criteria different in cosurt,
grand juries, and legislative committees?
The analysis might produce conclusions, for example,
that legislative investigating committees should have
no power to compel disclosures at all, and that judges
in courts should have wide discretion in any particular
instance to excuse or compel disclosure as the balance
of need for information and private interests of the
witness appears to indicate.
Compare the statements of Circuit Judge Edgerton
and Professor McCormick with respect to the related
question of privileged communications:
"I think a communication made in reasonable
confidence that it will not be disclosed, and in such
circumstances that disclosure is shocking to the moral
sense of the community, should not be disclosed in a
judicial proceeding, whether the trusted person is or is
not a wife, husband, doctor, lawyer, or minister."
Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 281 (D.C. Cir.
1958) (Edgerton, J., concurring).
"Even if we concede that there is ground for some
protection for these privileged confidences greater than
the interest of secrecy for such unprivileged relations
as parent and child, brother and sister, or employer
and confidential secretary, it surely goes too far to
place the screen before such protected confidences
without regard for what the countervailing need for the
evidence may be in the interest of justice. A wholesale
rule of privilege whatever the need for disclosure is a
crude and clumsy handling of the problem." Mc-
cormick, Law and the Future: Evidence, 51 Nw. U. L.
R~v. 218, 220-21 (1956).
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after the 1st Amendment albatross has been cut
free (as it must be before the matter can be dis-
cussed rationally") are two: [1] The first is to
remove the right to an answer in the hard cores of
instances where compulsion might lead to in-
humanity, the principal inhumanity being abusive
tactics by a zealous questioner.-4 [2] The second is
to comply with the prevailing ethic that the
individual is sovereign and that proper rules of
battle between government and individual require
that the individual not be bothered for less than
good reason and not be conscripted by his op-
ponent to defeat himself.5
Now, finally, to a quick expression of opinion
on a miscellany of points:
IC.] MISCELLANEOUS PROBLEMS
[1] In what proceedings should the privilege
apply? It follows from the purposes of the privilege
just mentioned that the privilege should be avail-
able only in proceedings in which the government
is the interrogator. That is, it plays little or no
role in normal civil litigation. It serves one or both
of its principal policies, mainly as to suspects but
also as to third-party witnesses, in criminal pro-
ceedings of all kinds. It probably plays its most
important role in free-wheeling legislative in-
vestigations where both policies of the privilege
are applicable and, incidentally, where there is
rarely a demonstrable need for the disclosure.
[Privilege in the Police Station?]
[2] Does the privilege apply in the police station?
No, it does not.56 But this is a quibble. Both
-'See the discussion of Reason 9 supra in text at
note 35.
"This is included in Reason 11 supra.
15 This is Reason 12 supra.
56 Since police have no legal right to compel answers,
there is no legal obligation to which a privilege in the
technical sense can apply. That is, it makes no sense
to say that one is privileged not to disclose-that one is
excused from the legal consequences of contumacy-
when there are no legal consequences of contumacy.
The contrary arguments-those favoring extension
of the privilege to police interrogations-should be
stated, however. There are several: (1) That, while
there is no legal obligation to disclose to police, the
police may successfully misrepresent that there is
such a legal obligation; and that, while there may be
no legal sanction for contumacy in a police investiga-
tion, there may be an illegal one, and that the methods
to compel disclosure threatened or used by police may
be more fearsome than those threatened or used by a
court. Since police, like courts, are agents of the state,
the argument runs, it would not be illogical to hold
that any self-incriminating disclosures obtained by
police as a consequence of coercion or of successful
policies of the privilege which I accept, as well as
most of those which I reject, apply with full force
to insure that police in informal interrogations not
have the right to compel self-incriminatory
misrepresentation that disclosure was obligatory lie
treated in the same manner as self-incriminating
disclosures improperly obtained by a court. (2) That
American, police in their investigations perform the
function of the old English committing magistrate,
before whom the privilege did apply. (3) That, al-
though constitutional language in this area is not too
helpful, the self-incrimination clause in no instance
grants, in terms, a "privilege" to be free from legal
compulsion, but in most instances states simply that
the person shall "not be compelled to give evidence
against himself." The objective of police interrogation
of a suspect is of course to induce him in a sense to
give evidence against himself. (4) That the confessions
doctrine has not yet in all jurisdictions been extended
to exclude evidence of coerced admissions of facts or
of silence from which one might infer guilt, as contrasted
with evidence of coerced confessions admitting all
elements of the crime. According to the argument, the
privilege should be extended to exclude evidence of
such admissions and silence.
Federal decisions on the point are in conflict despite
Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897). In that
case (at 542) Mr. Justice White declared that, "In
criminal trials, in the courts of the United States,
wherever a question arises whether a confession is
incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is con-
trolled by that portion of the fifth amendment to the
constitution of the United States commanding that
no person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself.' " The Brain case, a curious
one in which the "coerced confession" seems to have
been neither a confession nor coerced and, furthermore,
one in which the statement was obtained by an officer
of a foreign government, purports to be a square holding
that coerced confessions are excluded by the privilege
against self-incrimination. The Brain case was cited
with approval in Bullock v. United States, 122 F.2d
213, 215 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (dictum of Edgerton, J.), and
the same result was reached in Brock v. United States,
223 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1955). Nevertheless, dicta in a
number of federal cases treat the point as still unde-
cided. E.g., United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36,
41 (1951); Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410,
414 n.2 (1948); Helton v. United States, 221 F.2d 338,
341 (5th Cir. 1955). In one federal case there is dictum
clearly implyifig that the privilege has no application
to police interrogations. Wood v. United States, 128
F.2d 265, 268 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
State cases are similarly in conflict. See, e.g., People
v. Simmons, 28 Cal.2d 699, 716, 719, 720, 172 P.2d 18
(1946) (privilege applies); People v. Shroyer, 336 Il1.
324, 168 N.E. 336 (1929) (privilege applies); People v.
Fox, 319 Ill. 606, 150 N.E. 347 (1926) (privilege does
not apply); State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N.W.
935 (1902) (privilege applies); Claflin v. State, 154
Kan. 452, 119 P.2d 540 (1941) (privilege applies);
People v. Owen, 154 Mich. 571, 118 N.W. 590 (1908)
(privilege does not apply); Matter of Schmidt v. District
Attorney, 225 App. Div. 353, 357, 8 N.Y.S.2d 787
(1938) (privilege applies); Abston v. State. 139 Tex.
Cr. 416, 417, 141 S.W.2d 337 (1940) (privilege applies);
Owens v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 689, 43 S.E.2d 895,
898 (1947) (privilege does not apply).
Both the Model Code of Evidence (Rule 203) and
the Uniform Rules of Evidence (Rule 25) would extend
JOHN T. McNA UGHTON
answers. Whether the result is reached by pointing
out the elementary fact that police have not been
given the authority to compel disclosures of any
kind or whether the result is put on the ground
that the person questioned is "privileged" not to
answer makes little difference. Answers should not
be compelled by police. There is a desperate need
for an acceptable substitute for police interrogation
of suspects. I hope that this conference will con-
tribute something toward that need.
[Two-Sovereignty Rule]
13] What about the two-sovereignty rule? The
domestic interrogator is not spurred by any "con-
viction hunger" when the requested disclosure
incriminates only under'foreign law; so the risk of
inhumane treatment is not unusually high. The
government questioning and the witness being
questioned are not "at war" where the only in-
crimination is under foreign law; so the sentiments
establishing "rules of battle" are inapplicable.
Assuming my assessment of the policies under-
lying the privilege to be correct, then, the privilege
has no relevancy where no crime of the forum is
involved, where disclosures involving foreign
crimes are of no more interest to the interrogator
than any other disclosures compelled of the
witness.
It might be added that even if my analysis of
policies is wrong, and the purpose of the privilege
is to excuse the witness from the unpleasantness,
the indignity, the "unnatural" conduct of de-
nouncing himself, there is a strong argument that
the privilege to police interrogations in the following
language: "[Elvery natural person has a privilege,
which he may claim, to refuse to disclose in an action or
to a public official of this state or any governmental
agency or division thereof any matter that will in-
criminate him ..... ." (Emphasis added.) The Model
Code (Rule 232) and the Uniform Rules (Rule 38)
continue that "Evidence of a statement or other dis-
closure is inadmissible against the holder of the privilege
if the judge finds that he had and claimed a privilege
to refuse to make such disclosure but was nevertheless
required to make it." For such provisions to serve their
desired beneficial purpose, present methods of police
questioning would have to be altered drastically,
causing without doubt a substantial reduction in
effectiveness. Procedures would have to be adopted to
insure that the suspect was made aware of his privilege,
perhaps by a warning such as that used in England
and required by the Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.
§831(c) (Supp. V, 1958). It might also require a right
to counsel and a verbatim record of proceedings at the
interrogation. On these points, see Meltzer, Required
Records, the McCarran Act, and the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 18 U. Cm. L. REv. 687, 695-98
(1951); Pound, Legal Interrogation of Persons Accused
or Suspected of Crime, 24 J. CaRm. L. & C. 1014 (1934.)
incrimination under foreign law should nevertheless
be disregarded. Recognition of such a risk as a
basis for privilege would put the interrogating
sovereign in the position of being unable, even by
granting the fullest immunities within its power,
to compel what may be essential information. This
result may not be intolerable, but it is quite in-
convenient.
A solution to the problem, at least where it
appears that there has been cooperation between
the local inquisitors and foreign prosecutors, ap-
pears to be emerging. It is not to privilege dis-
closure but rather in some manner to prevent its
use by the foreign government.57
[What "Tends to Incriminate"?
[4] What, for purposes of the privilege, "tends
to incriminate"?58 Any fact requested of a criminal
-defendant by the prosecution at his trial, if
relevant, is on the prosecution's own assumption
incriminating. It of course does not follow that a
criminal defendant should be spared having the
questions put to him and having to plead the
privilege. The incorporation of this fringe benefit,
however, another accident in the development of
the constitutional/common-law privilege, is
sensible enough. But what is the rule of general
application? It should be this: A fact tends to
incriminate only [a] if its disclosure would increase
the probability that the witness wiU be convicted
of a crime, and [b] if after its disclosure the witness
will be in substantial danger of conviction of the
crime. This definition could, of course, extend to
any "clue" fact which increases the probability
that a "subordinate" fact will be discovered and
thus that an "ultimate" fact, and the "crime,"
will be proved. The difficulty here nowadays lies
in the failure of the courts, first, to adhere to the
test that the risk be substantial,5 and, second, to
67 Discussion of this possibility, most recently sug-
gested by Mills v. Louisiana, 360 U.S. 230 (1959), is
the main object of a recent article of mine. McNaugh-
ton, Self-Incrimination Under Foreign Law, 45 VA. L.
R, v. 1299 (1959).
18 The leading case on this point is Hoffman v.
United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
69 See Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 203
(1955) (dissenting opinion of Harlan, J.)- Hinds v.
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 155 A.2d 721, 735-36
(Me. 1959) (Webber, J.: "So many persons have claimed
the privilege in recent years for reasons based upon
political convictions or upon their personal philosophy
as to the proper scope of inquiry and examination
rather than upon honest fear of self-incrimination, that
the probabilities that might otherwise have tended to
support such a presumption [that the plea was in good
faithl have been greatly diminished.").
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require that the claimant make a decent showing
that the test has been met. The progeny of Hoffman
v. United States have distended the privilege so far
that it is now virtually impossible to think of a
question in any way relevant to a criminal in-
vestigation to which any witness could not suc-
cessfully plead the privilege." Indeed, it is now
difficult logically to avoid the conclusion that the
plea of privilege itself tends to incriminate!6'
Go See, e.g., Courtney v. United States, 236 F.2d
921 (2d Cir. 1956), which applies the principle of Hoff-
man v. United States, note 58 supra. A witness before
a grand jury refused to name persons to whom he was
forced by business considerations to pay small amounts
of tribute. His conviction for contempt was reversed
on the ground that disclosure would supply clues which
might lead to his conviction for not filing information
returns required by the Internal Revenue Code. This
possibility of incrimination played no part in the wit-
ness' refusal to answer and was not even unearthed
until after his appearances before the grand jury.
11 See the writings of Professors Byse, Kalven and
Ratner on the point. They would all, as I read them,
permit a plea of privilege when the true answer would
be "No" to the question, "Are you now or have you
ever been a member of subversive organization A?"
Professor Ratner would allow the plea on the straight-
forward ground that, if privilege could he pleaded only
when the true answer would be "Yes," then the plea
of privilege would itself provide the very clue against
which the privilege was designed to protect. That is,
the plea would itself be self-ncnminating. Ratner,
Consequences of Exercisin the Privilege Against Self-
Incrinioion, 24 U. CM. L. Rev. 472, 490 (1957).
Professor Kalven takes essentially the same position.
Umvxz~srry or CHICAGo RouND TAnrx, Aug. 23, 1953,
p. 4. Professar Byse apparently would allow the plea,
although the true answer would be "No," only if the
question as to subversive organization A was in a
series of questions-for hample, as to membership in
subversive organizations A, B, C, D, etc.-at least one
of which (say as to C) would call for a truthful answer
of "Yes." His reasoning seems to be that the contrast
between the plea of privilege as to question C and the
negative answers as to questions A, B and D serves to
equate the plea with a "Yes" answer. Byse, Teachers
and the Fifth Amendment, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 871, 876
(1954).
There is of course merit to the observations of these
scholars. Their proposal that a witness be permitted in
effect to employ "ringer" or "red herring" pleas in order
to dilute the clue-giving nature of the plea may be
justified. It is similar to the device used in Arabian
Nights: Putting an X on every door deprives the X on
the door of the intended victim of its significance. On
the other band, that we are driven by logic to such
devices might suggest that the whole concept of allow-
ance of privilege to avoid "clues" has gotten entirely
out of hand.
Compare the point made by Dean Griswold. He
suggests that a plea of privilege is proper (at least if
the question relates to membership in the Communist
Party) because a truthful "No" answer may put the
witness in the position where "in his own interest he
may have to undertake to state and explain his member-
ship and activities in the various front organizations."
Giswow., THE FnTH Amss DSENT TODAY 19 (1955).
Compare also a quite different kind of "No" answer.
[Immunity Statutes]
[5] How broad must an immunity be? The
Supreme Court in Counselman v. Hitchcock said
that an immunity statute, "to be valid, must
afford absolute immunity against future prose-
cution for the offense to which the question
relates."' ' This has been assumed to be the law.
It should not be, however. The "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine has sufficed in the areas
of search and seizure6 3 and wiretap.64 While the
considerations are not exactly the same, that doc-
trine should suffice here. A statute which proscribes
the use, directly or indirectly, of the compelled
disclosure should be held constitutional.
In conclusion-
[The Desirable Course]
[6] What would I like to see done with the
privilege?
Well, first, let me emphasize that one does not
advise surgery lightly-not unless the need is
patent. Furthermore, one does not, when he per-
forms the surgery on one part of the body, do it
without regard for the impact on other parts of
the body. The same is true of surgery on an insti-
tution integral to the legal organism. As Judge
Learned Hand, speaking of the institution of trial
by jury, once said, "Like much else in human
affairs, its defects are so deeply enmeshed in the
This phenomenon appears where a question is asked
the answer to which negatively has incriminating impli-
cations. Thus if it is known that a crime was committed
at noon in the northeast quadrant of a circle and that
the witness was somewhere in the circle that noon, the
fact that he was not then in the soutinvest quadrant is,
by a process of subtraction, an incriminating fact. Or
if it is known that the witness was in the northeast
quadrant at some time during the day, the fact that be
was not there at 6 p.m. is, by the same process of sub-
traction, an incriminating fact. The privilege properly
covers such "subtractive" facts. It is important to
distinguish from this type of question, which usually
appears in a pin-pointing series and each of which
truly elicits an incriminating fact, the question men-
tioned earlier which usually appears in an open-ended
series and which does not involve the subtractive
process.
See Communist Party v. Subversive Activities
Control Board, 223 F.2d 531, 548-49 (D.C. Cir. 1954),
rev'd on other grounds, 351 U. S. 115 (1956) ("a witness
cannot refuse to take the stand on the ground that
pleading the privilege will itself tend to incriminate
him").
142 U. S. 547, 586 (1892).
1 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U. S. 385 (1920).
4 Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 341
(1939) (this case was the source of the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" phrase).
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system that wholly to disentangle them would
quite kill it.''6 5
Nevertheless, I wish for surgery.
Before I wished too much change in the privilege
itself, however, I would be pleased to see one or
more developments along these lines: [a] First,
some form of a 1st Amendment privilege, which
would relieve the 5th Amendment privilege of its
illicit but apparently necessary burden in "belief
probes." 66 [b] Second, a grant of some discretion
to judges to compel or excuse disclosures as the
competing interests indicate.6 7 And [c], third,
elimination of the oath for criminal suspects and
defendants (and perhaps elimination of penalties
for false testimony and contempt by them as well).
Those developments should come first.
Then, as for the privilege itself, [a] I would like
to see a reversal in the constitutional drift-and
if necessary constitutional amendment in juris-
65 Jorgensen v. New York Ice Machinery Corp., 160
F.2d 432, 435 (2d Cir. 1947).
66 See note 37 supra for evidence of the Supreme
Court's struggle with this problem.
67 See note 52 supra on this point. Wigmore suggests
that the trial judge has inherent power "to decline to
compel production [of a document] where in the case
in hand the document's utility in evidence would not
be commensurate with the detriment to the wit-
ness ... ." He cites no authority. 8 WIGMORE, EVI-
ENCE § 2211 (3d ed. 1940). A minor addition to Uniform
Rule of Evidence 45 would achieve the objective
suggested in the text.
dictions where amendment is not out of the
question-with a hope that all that would even-
tually remain of the privilege would be its function
as a complement of the requirement of probable
cause. That is, one would be privileged, as John
Lilburn insisted, not to provide the first evidence
against himself. [b] I would leave the witness-abuse
problem entirely to the due process clause, with
Rochin v. California" and the offspring of Brown
v. Mississippi9 providing the starting points for
reasoning. Such a rule would be almost as pro-
phylactic and much less wasteful. It would not
flush the baby down the drain with the bath water.
The changes would probably stir emotions only
during a relatively short transitional period. Like
the medieval citizens who at first clung to trial by
ordeal and raised the equivalent of "due process"
objections to jury fact-finding, 0 we would prob-
ably adjust to and prefer the new procedures.
Scholars meeting at the bicentennial of North-
western University School of Law in the year 2060
would look back and wonder what the fuss was all
about.
68 342 U. S. 165 (1952).
297 U. S. 278 (1936). The principle was applied
most recently in Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315
(1959), and in Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U. S. 199
(1960).
7 0 
PLucKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW 125 (5th ed. 1956).
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